We present a method to search for a probe (or query) image representation against a large gallery in the encrypted domain. We require that the probe and gallery images be represented in terms of a fixed length representation, which is typical for representations obtained from learned networks. Our encryption scheme is agnostic to how the fixed length representation is obtained and can therefore be applied to any fixed length representation in any application domain. Our method, dubbed HERS (Homomorphically Encrypted Representation Search), operates by: (i) compressing the representation towards its estimated intrinsic dimensionality, (ii) encrypting the compressed representation using the proposed fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and (iii) searching against a gallery of encrypted representations directly in the encrypted domain, without decrypting them, and with minimal loss of accuracy. Numerical results on large galleries of face, fingerprint, and object datasets such as ImageNet show that, for the first time, accurate and fast image search within the encrypted domain is feasible at scale (296 seconds; 46× speed up over state-of-the-art for face search against a background of 1 million).
Introduction
In 2014, a hack on the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) left 22 million user records exposed, including millions of fingerprint records. Data breaches, like the OPM hack, could have untold consequences against those whose personal identifiable information (PII 1 ) was compromised, including identity theft, robbery, unauthorized access to secure facilities, and blackmail. Sadly, in today's day and age, data-breaches like these are not isolated incidents 2 3 4 , motivating and necessitating the development of strong encryption techniques which protect the underlying data at all times.
Perhaps the most vulnerable category of stored data still needing adequate protection is that of image representations (e.g. face representations). While many forms of data can be sufficiently secured in a database with a well-known Given an image representation (template), it is either (i) stored in a database (enrollment) or (ii) passed to the matcher for searching. Both the database and the matcher are potential points of attack. An attacker can either steal a template directly from an unencrypted database, launching an impersonation attack. Or, if the database were AES encrypted, the hacker could attack the matcher where templates are decrypted for comparison. In our approach, (i) the templates are encrypted during database enrollment and (ii) the templates are matched within the encrypted domain. As such, a hacker is unable to exploit any meaningful information from stolen templates. encryption scheme like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [18] , image representations present a unique challenge. In particular, query image representations are often searched against other representations already enrolled in the database (e.g. a face search system). Even if the enrolled representations were protected with AES, they would have to be decrypted prior to matching with a query representation, leaving both of them vulnerable at the point of comparison ( Fig. 1 ). As such, it is critically important to develop strong encryption techniques to protect image representations in the database and during matching.
While much research continues in the area of improving the discriminative power of image representations (e.g. face recognition [56, 42] and image classification [40] ), relatively little effort has been invested into ensuring the security of the representations after they have been learned. This is alarming considering deep face representations can be (i) reconstructed back into their corresponding face image ( Fig. 1) [29] or (ii) violate user privacy by mining demographic attributes such as age, ethnicity, or gender [27] . More generally, it is well known that local features, such as deep CNN representations [10] , SIFT [55, 36] , HOG [53] and Bag-of-Visual-Words [21] , can be inverted back into the image space with high fidelity.
Homomorphic Encryption
A special class of encryption algorithms which enable basic arithmetic operations (multiplications and/or additions) in the encrypted domain are known as homomorphic encryption (HE) systems [16] . Since representations extracted by CNNs are typically compared using simple distance metrics like euclidean distance or cosine similarity, HE systems are a plausible solution to protect the representations within the database, and also during matching. It is worth noting that HE systems also satisfy other major requirements of feature matching systems [30] , including diversity, revocability, security, performance, and privacy.
The barrier against using HE schemes "off-the-shelf" [13] for protection of image representations is the computational complexity of arithmetic operations directly on the ciphertext (in the encrypted domain). This is especially true of fully-homomorphic encryption schemes (FHE) which enable both additions and multiplications within the encrypted domain [13] . For example, the authors in [49] showed that a naive implementation of FHE requires 48.7 MB of memory and 12.8 seconds to match a single pair of 512-dimensional encrypted face representations. Such computational requirements restrict the application of FHE schemes in 1 : 1 matching applications and completely render them impractical in 1 : m search applications at scale.
To overcome these limitations, we present a practical solution, dubbed HERS, for 1 : m encrypted feature matching at scale. This is achieved through a synergistic combination of dimensionality reduction of features and development of a more efficient FHE scheme.
Contributions
-A data encoding scheme that is tailored for efficient 1 : m representation matching in the encrypted domain by leveraging SIMD 5 [7] and Boddeti [5] proposed FHE based schemes which leverage a batching technique to reduce the memory and computational requirements for 1 : 1 matching of binary iris (Hamming distance) and quantized face representations (cosine distance), respectively, in the encrypted domain. Boddeti showed that two 512-dimensional face representations could be compared with 16 KB of memory and in 2.5 milliseconds. Engelsma et al.
[11] adopted the same scheme for 1 : 1 matching of 192-dimensional encrypted fingerprint representations in 1.25 milliseconds. In contrast, early FHE schemes for the same took 100 seconds per match [5] . Although these algorithmic savings enable using FHE for 1 : 1 matching applications, the time and space complexity remains intractable for most 1 : m matching applications (image search). For example, encrypted search against a m = 1, 000, 000 gallery representations that are of dimensionality 512 would still take over 230 minutes and 90GB memory with the improved FHE scheme proposed in [5] . As such, in this work we develop a FHE based solution that is explicitly designed for efficient 1 : m encrypted matching and can be applied to any image search application.
Privacy-Preserving Visual Recognition: Within the broader context of computer vision there is growing interest in privacy-preserving techniques. These First, we estimate the intrinsic dimensionality of a given representation [17] in an offline stage from a gallery p1, . . . , pm. Subsequently, we reduce the dimensionality of the representation towards its intrinsic dimensionality (EID) as much as possible, such that minimal accuracy is lost, using a deep network based non-linear mapping (DeepMDS++). Finally, the compressed representation pi is homomorphically encrypted REnc and passed on to our fast encrypted search algorithm.
approaches are based on cryptographic methods or computer vision techniques. Cryptographic methods include face detection [2, 3] using secure multi-party computation, image retrieval [44] by oblivious transfer (a building block of secure multi-party computation), face verification [52] using the Paillier Cryptosystem, video surveillance [51] using Secret Sharing, learning from private data via differential privacy [1] and homomorphic encryption [14, 57] . Computer vision techniques include camera localization [46, 47] by lifting 2D and 3D points to 2D and 3D lines, detecting private computer screens [24] using CNNs, and activity recognition [38,41] through image manipulation. In contrast to the foregoing, HERS adopts a synergistic combination of computer vision techniques in the form of dimensionality reduction and cryptographic methods (FHE scheme), resulting in both efficient and accurate representation matching in the encrypted domain at scale.
Approach
There are essentially two ways to improve search efficiency in the encrypted domain: (i) the encryption scheme itself can be optimized for faster search, and (ii) the dimensionality of the representation can be compressed as far as possible, such that no accuracy is lost. We achieve fast and accurate search at scale in the encrypted domain by coupling both of these techniques in HERS (Fig. 2 ). In the following sections, we elaborate on each of these steps individually.
Problem Setup
A typical representation matching task involves a database of m template feature vectors P = [p 1 , . . . , p m ] ∈ R d×m against which a query representation q ∈ R d is matched. The result of the matching process is a score that determines the degree of similarity between q and each template in P . A common metric that is adopted in computer vision is the Euclidean distance or the cosine similarity. At the core, both of these metrics involve matrix-vector products of the form: r(P , q) = P T q. Hence, the representation matching process is comprised of md scalar multiplications and md scalar additions.
We devise a solution to cryptographically guarantee the security of the database P as well as the query q to prevent leakage of any private information. This can be achieved through a parameterized function that transforms a representation z from the original space into an alternate space, i.e., E(z) = f (z; θ pk ), where f (·; θ pk ) is the encryption function with public-key θ pk and z = g(E(z); θ sk ), where g(·; θ sk ) is the decryption function with private-key θ sk . The key idea of our paper is to adopt an encryption function to secure the database and the query while retaining our ability to compute their matching score efficiently at scale and without any loss of accuracy i.e.,
FHE satisfies this property and enables us to preserve user privacy. Even if a malicious attacker can gain access to the database of feature representations, without access to the private-key θ sk the attacker cannot reconstruct the underlying image or extract any other information inherent to the representation.
Fast Secure Distance Computation
We use the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) scheme [12] as our base FHE scheme. The mathematical basis of this scheme lies in modular arithmetic. Building upon this scheme, we propose a data encoding technique that is tailored for efficient 1 : m representation matching. We now briefly describe the different components of our approach.
Fan-Vercauteren Scheme: Plaintext space of the FV scheme is represented as a polynomial ring over a finite field R t = Z t [x]/Φ n (x), where t ∈ Z is an integer and Φ n (x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree at most n − 1. Upon encrypting the plaintext polynomial, the encrypted numbers (ciphertext) are encoded as polynomials in the ring R q . The FV scheme utilizes three keys, (1) a private decryption key θ sk , (2) a public encryption key θ pk , and (3) evaluation keys θ ev which are necessary for multiplication over encrypted data. Addition and multiplication of two ciphertexts translates to polynomial addition and dyadic multiplication in R q . As long as the coefficients of the resulting polynomials do not exceed q, correctness is ensured. The exact description of the entire scheme, including encryption, decryption, ciphertext addition and ciphertext multiplication, is deferred to Appendix A.
Encoding Scheme: The FV scheme is designed to act on integers only. As such, we need to encode our real valued representation q ∈ R d into an integer valued representation q ∈ Z d . We quantize a given representation's real-valued features into integers with a precision of 0.004 and represent these integers in base w. The utility of the FV scheme is critically dependent on the encoding scheme chosen to represent the quantized features in the ring R t . Therefore, to maintain the integrity of ciphertext computations, the choice of the ring R t needs to ensure that the range of values after the desired ciphertext operations remain within the same ring.
Our key contribution in this paper is a custom encoding scheme for efficient 1 : m matching by utilizing the SIMD primitives [20] of the FV scheme. The primitives operate over an array of numbers instead of a single number, encoding multiple numbers within the same polynomial using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The encoding scheme in Boddeti [5] is also based on the same principles but is specifically suitable for 1 : 1 matching.
Given a query q ∈ Z d and a database of feature vectors P ∈ Z d×m , the encoding scheme in [5] encodes each sample (column) into a polynomial. In contrast, in HERS, the client node encodes each dimension (row) of the representation into a polynomial. A query q is encoded into d plaintexts as,
Similarly, for the database, each dimension of all the templates P i· ∈ Z m are encoded into polynomial, resulting in d plaintexts,
In this case, the polynomial which encodes the inner products of the query q and the templates P can be obtained as,
where the product g * h is standard polynomial multiplication. As a consequence, the m < n 6 inner products can be computed through d polynomial multiplications. The FV encryption scheme, the corresponding cryptographic primitives, and ciphertext addition and multiplication, operate on this plaintext representation.
Enrollment Protocol: The client generates a public-private key pair. Given a template p, the client (i) quantizes the features, (ii) encodes the quantized template into a plaintext polynomial, (iii) encrypts the plaintext into a ciphertext using the public key, and (iv) transmits the ciphertext along with metadata of the template to the server. The server then adds the encrypted query to the database. Therefore, the server does not have access to the raw representation of the database at any point. The complete enrollment protocol is described in Algorithm 6 of the Appendix. 6 When m > n we can chunk the m samples into m n databases of n samples each. 
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Search Protocol: Given a query q, the client (i) quantizes the features, (ii) encodes the quantized query into a plaintext polynomial, (iii) encrypts the plaintext into a ciphertext using the private key, and (iv) transmits the ciphertext to the server. The server computes the encrypted scores as described above and sends them back to the client. The client now decrypts the encrypted scores using the private-key and obtains the index of the nearest match. This index can then be transmitted back to the server depending on the downstream tasks. Therefore, the server does not have access to the raw representation of the query or the matching scores at any point. The complete search protocol is described in Algorithm 7 of the Appendix.
Computational Complexity
The key technical barrier to realizing homomorphic encryption based representation matching is the computational complexity of the FV scheme, especially ciphertext multiplication. Fundamentally, the addition/multiplication of two integers in the plaintext transforms to addition/multiplication of two polynomials of degree n, leading to a n-fold and O(n 2 ) 7 -fold increase in computational complexity for addition and multiplication, respectively. Therefore, mitigating the number of ciphertext multiplications can lead to large gains in practical utility. Table 1 compares the computational complexity of different encoding schemes for secure distance computation. A naïve implementation of the FV scheme, i.e., no SIMD, encrypts each element of the representation and performs score matching. Such a scheme has a large computational burden bordering on being impractical for real-world applications. The 1:1 matching scheme in [5] is specifically designed for vector-vector inner products by encoding an entire d-dimensional feature vector into a polynomial. A major computational bottleneck in their scheme is the need for expensive ciphertext rotations in order to compute the inner product without access to the individual dimensions of the ciphertext vector. Therefore, this approach scales linearly with the size of the database m. In contrast, we observe that our proposed encoding scheme enables HERS to scale to larger databases due to slower rate of increase in computational complexity by a factor of ∼ O d n .
Dimensionality Reduction for Faster FHE Matching
From the previous subsection we observe that a smaller feature dimension d provides a greater computational savings for 1 : m matching in comparison to existing approaches. Therefore, to further ease the computational burden of HERS, we reduce the dimensionality of a given representation as much as possible, while still retaining accuracy (i.e. we attempt to map a representation from the ambient space to its intrinsic dimensionality 8 ). For example, we show a reduction of an ImageNet representation from its 1,536-dim ambient space to a 64-dim space while losing only 1% average precision, but getting a 24 times search speed up within the encrypted domain.
Recent work [17] has shown that representations learned by deep convolutional neural networks are highly redundant, i.e., they lie on a low-dimensional manifold whose intrinsic dimensionality is 20× to 30× smaller than the ambient space that the representation is embedded in. The authors in [17] further showed that deep network based non-linear mappings provided a more accurate mapping from a representation's ambient space to its intrinsic space than existing dimensionality reduction techniques. The authors aptly named their dimensionality reduction technique "DeepMDS", since DeepMDS follows a similar paradigm as Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) in preserving pairwise distances between the ambient and intrinsic spaces.
At its core, DeepMDS [17] is a deep network comprised of multiple non-linear layers, and is trained to project an embedding from its ambient space to the intrinsic space, such that pairwise distances are preserved. More formally, let q ∈ R d be a high-dimensional representation in the ambient space and f (·; w) be the DeepMDS non-linear mapping function with parameters w. Then, a representation y in the estimated intrinsic space is computed in accordance with y = f (x; w)
To train the weights w in f (·; w), let G 1 , G 2 , I 1 , and I 2 be matrices where rows in each matrix are unit length representations in the ambient space, corresponding rows in G 1 and G 2 are two representations extracted from images with the same class label (genuine pairs), corresponding rows in I 1 , and I 2 are two representations extracted from images with different class labels (imposter pairs), and N is the number of rows in the matrices (mini-batch size). Then, each of the rows of these matrices are projected to the intrinsic space giving four new matrices defined asĜ 1 ,Ĝ 2 ,Î 1 , andÎ 2 with a much lower dimensionality (reduced number of columns).
Next, pairwise distances between genuine pairs D G and imposter pairs D I in the ambient space and intrinsic space (D G ,D I ) are computed as:
where u(·) returns the diagonal elements of the matrix multiplication. Finally, the DeepMDS loss is computed in accordance with:
8 Intrinsic dimensionality [17] is the lowest number of dimensions needed to maintain the information present in the ambient representation.
Although the authors in [17] showed impressive results in their dimensionality reduction scheme, it suffers from several limitations which needed to be addressed in order to use in HERS . First, DeepMDS was mostly trained and tested on the same dataset, making it vulnerable to overfitting. This is problematic as we would almost certainly need to train and test on different datasets in real world applications. Second, the DeepMDS loss is formulated to optimize over the average pairwise distance deviations in a mini-batch. However, this does not focus the training towards smaller subsets or modes of representations for which the embedding is not effective, since they will be averaged out in a randomly selected mini-batch. Both of these weaknesses manifest themselves downstream in the form of lower accuracy at lower dimensions, especially as we noticed, when training and testing on different datasets. Since our application is highly cognizant of accuracy (we do not want to trade security for accuracy), we propose DeepMDS++, a deep network based dimensionality reduction technique which aims to solve the short-comings of DeepMDS.
Covariance Penalty: To help prevent overfitting on cross-dataset evaluations, in DeepMDS++, we adopt a covariance penalty to encourage features in the intrinsic space which are less correlated. As was shown in [8] , decorrelated features generalize better than correlated features. More formally, in DeepMDS++, we compute an additional loss term L c in accordance with the equation below:
where C is the covariance matrix computed across our mini-batch [Ĝ 1 ;Ĝ 2 ;Î 1 ;Î 2 ] and diag(·) returns a diagonal matrix, with diagonal values equivalent to the input matrix.
Hard Pair Mining: To prevent DeepMDS from overfitting to a mode of representations, via its averaging of the pairwise distance deviations in a mini-batch, we introduce a hard-mining strategy [42] with a specific focus on "harder pairs" to fill out our mini-batch. In particular, we want to select those pairs for which the pairwise distance is not well preserved after their mapping into the intrinsic space. In this way we prevent DeepMDS++ from doing well on the average case, while ignoring other modes in the data (which seriously effects cross dataset generalization).
More formally, the mini-batch indices of the hard genuine pairs P G and the hard imposter pairs P I can be computed as:
where argsort(·) will return the indices of the rows in matrices G i and I i , i ∈ {1, 2} with the highest deviation in pairwise distances following their projection into the intrinsic space (i.e. the hardest pairs). In our experimental results (all cross-dataset) we show that the incorporation of these training techniques into DeepMDS++ aids us in compressing representations towards their intrinsic dimensionality with lower loss of accuracy, ultimately enabling us to perform matching in the encrypted domain at much faster speeds.
Experiments
Our experiments are designed to (i) evaluate the improvement in image search speed with our improved fully homomorphic encryption wrapper, (ii) demonstrate the further speed improvements following dimensionality reduction, and (iii) show the improvements of our deep dimensionality reduction method DeepMDS++ over DeepMDS, enabling our compression of representations for faster encrypted search.
Implementation Details
DeepMDS++ is implemented in Tensorflow 1.14.0. The network architecture is provided in Appendix D. We use the Adam optimizer [23] with a starting learning rate of 3 × 10 −4 and weight regularization with decay set to 4 × 10 −5 . We train for 250 epochs, lasting 6 hours, on a NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU. When using hard-mining, we set the mini-batch size N = 4, 000. At the start of training, we mine 50 hard genuine pairs and 50 hard imposter pairs which are augmented with 200 random genuine pairs and 200 random imposter pairs, respectively. Then, we linearly increase the number of hard genuine and hard imposter pairs from 50 to 250 over the 250 training epochs.
The implementation of the homomorphic encryption component of HERS is based on the SEAL library [43] . For all experiments, we used a 10-core Intel i9-7900X processor running at 3.30 GHz. We use a single-threaded environment. The three main parameters of the encryption scheme (n, t, q) are set to n = 4, 096, t = 1, 032, 193 and q is the default value 9 in SEAL i.e., a product of 3 very large primes, each 36 bits long.
Evaluation Datasets
-ImageNet ILSVRC 2012: 1000 classes with 1.28 million training images and 50K validation images. We randomly select 100 classes from the training and validation set for training/testing classification accuracy and precision/recall, and we use the entire validation set for testing precision @ 10. 
Evaluation Protocol and Experimental Results
To evaluate the efficacy of HERS , (i) we benchmark its efficiency at different gallery sizes and with different representation dimensions against Boddeti [5] , and (ii) we benchmark the matching and search accuracy at different representation dimensions against DeepMDS [17]. Efficiency: Figure 3 , compares the search speed of the encryption component of HERS with [5] . We show the speed for 1,536-dim, 512-dim, and 192-dim to align with the original dimensionality of our different representation models. [5] is unsurprisingly more efficient, since it was explicitly designed for 1:1 matching. However, as the gallery increases HERS is more efficient. Admittedly these methods are orders of magnitude slower than matching in the unencrypted domain, but HERS is the first practically scalable search over an encrypted database. In terms of memory, for a 64-dim representation, HERS requires 5.9 MB for the probe template and 2.8 GB for a gallery of size 1 million. In comparison [5] requires less memory for the probe at 19K, but exhausts 90 GB for the same gallery size. [58] ). For classification experiments on ImageNet, we train a Linear SVM classifier (one-vs-rest) on top of our embeddings. To compute Precision @ 10, we randomly select 10 probes from each validation class, and use the remaining 40 from each class as mates. These mates are combined with the remaining 45, 000 distractors with 900 classes and 50 images / class. Table 3a and Table 3b compares the performance of DeepMDS++ and DeepMDS on the ImageNet dataset for the task of image retrieval and image classification, respectively. Figure 4 shows [58] ) search, respectively, as we compress the representations with DeepMDS++. These results suggest that, practically speaking, we can compress the face representations by a factor of 4× (512-dim to 128-dim) for a performance loss of 2.6% (81.4% to 78.8%). Similarly fingerprint representations can be compressed by a factor of 6× (192-dim to 32-dim) for a performance loss of 0.5% (94.5% to 94.0%). The degree of compression of the representation by DeepMDS++ closely mirrors the intrinsic dimensionality estimates 12 of the respective representations. The intrinsic dimensionalities of ArcFace, DeepPrint and Inception ResNet V2 are 15, 5 and 6 respectively, suggesting that unfolding ArcFace down to 16-dim is about three times as hard as compressing the latter two representations. Ablation: Table 5 shows the impact of hard-pair mining and the covariance loss on the ability of DeepMDS to compress the representations. We observe that hard-pair mining is effective across all dimensions while the covariance loss is more effective around 32 to 64 dimensions where a noticeable benefit is observed. The ability of DeepMDS++ to retain more discriminative information than DeepMDS affords compression to lower dimensions which in turn synergistically aids in improving the efficiency of encrypted search.
Discussion
Here we briefly comment on our choice of cryptographic solution, namely, FHE, the limitations induced by our choice and contrast it with other plausible cryptographic solutions. Two other alternative cryptographic solutions that can be employed in lieu of or in conjunction with FHE are: Partial Homomorphic Encryption (Paillier Cryptosystem [34]): This scheme supports only homomorphic additions and is significantly more efficient for scalars than the FV scheme we use. However, it does not support massively vectorized SIMD operations, which is the key source of efficiency in HERS . Secure Multi-Party Computation [15]: This scheme can be employed to securely compute the nearest neighbors (including matching score and argmax index) by employing multiple parties that communicate secret shares with each other in such a way that no single party can access all the features. This approach trades-off low computation for high communication costs. Furthermore, it requires that the database be split among multiple parties which may not be desirable in some applications. In contrast, the FHE scheme trades-off low-communication costs for high computational costs. The main drawback of the FV scheme is the limited arithmetic operations supported by it, namely addition and multiplication. Therefore, computing non-linear functions like max and argmax are not supported by HERS . In the context of search, as opposed to 1:1 verification, it is often sufficient to protect the gallery and query representations, as opposed to the matching scores. In such cases, our solution of computing the matching scores in the encrypted domain, having the client decrypt the scores and finally having the server respond with the matched database index should suffice.
Conclusions
In Gaussian. We note the plaintext polynomial (also called message) as m and the ciphertext polynomial as ct.
Fan-Vercauteren Scheme [12]: The FV scheme encodes integers to polynomials in a ring R t (see Eq.2 and Eq.3 for our encoding), referred to as plaintext. Given such a polynomial plaintext, the FV scheme defines the encryption and decryption protocols for such polynomials. The ciphertext is encoded as polynomials in a different ring R q .
Let λ be the desired level of security, w the base to represent numbers in, and l = log w q the number of terms in the decomposition of q into base w. Below are the details of the FV scheme in terms of key generation, encryption, decryption, addition and multiplication over encrypted integers. 8: return (c 0 , c 1 ) 9: end procedure
Algorithm 1 Key Generation

B Protocols
Here we describe the detailed algorithms of the two phases in HERS , namely, enrollment (Algorithm 6) and search (Algorithm 7). Both of these algorithms are built upon the cryptographic primitives described in Section A.
B.1 Enrollment
Algorithm 6 describes our entire enrollment procedure. The algorithm is designed to handle the scenario where the number of samples in the database m is larger than the ring dimension n (degree of the polynomial). The algorithm also considers a more practical scenario of online enrollment, i.e., we may wish to enroll one gallery feature vector at a time to the encrypted database. For this purpose, we first encrypt an all-zero feature representation and update it with each new gallery we wish to enroll. This is implemented in Lines 12 -22 of Algorithm 6 below.
Algorithm 6 HERS Enrollment 1: Encryption Parameters: coefficient bit length bc, plaintext modulus t,
ciphertext modulus q, ring dimension n 2: Server initializes empty database Di ← ∅ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, label set I ← ∅ and database index k = 0, v = 0 3: θ pk , θ sk , θev = GetKeys(λ, l, w, q) client generates keys 4: Inputs: id ∈ N m and q ∈ R d×m m feature vectors of dimension d each 5: for i = 1 to d do 6:
v ← k mod n 7:
m ← BatchEncode(qi·; v) i-th dim to v-th index of plaintext 8: cti = Encrypt(m; θ pk ,q,t) 9: end for 10: k ← k + m increment database index 11: Send ({ct1, . . . , ct d }, id) to the server enrollment at server 12: I ← I ∪ {id} 13:ṽ ← k n 14: ifṽ > v then 15:
D ← D ∪ {r1, . . . , r d } 16:
v ←ṽ 17:
ri ← Encrypt(0; θ pk ,q,t) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} initialize all zero ciphertext 18: else 19:
for i = 1 to d do enrollment at server 20:
ri ← CipherAdd(ri, cti;q) 21:
end for 22: end if encryption parameters (n, t, q) chosen by our experiments correspond to 128-bits of security.
The HERS system has three sources of vulnerability to attackers, namely, (1) the client device which holds the secret keys, (2) the communication channel between the client and server, and (3) the database which holds the encrypted representations and performs score computation in the encrypted domain. The physical and digital security of the client is most important in order to protect the secret keys. The security of the communication channel and the database server are guaranteed by the security of the FV scheme itself.
D DeepMDS++
DeepMDS++ is comprised of repeating block units. A single block unit structure is shown in Table 6 and is comprised of two fully-connected layers. The number of block units in a given DeepMDS++ model varies, depending on the dimensionality of the original ambient space and the final intrinsic (or as close as possible to intrinsic without losing accuracy) space. The specific repeating block unit structures for the three representation models utilized in this paper are shown (assuming the lowest output dimension reported for each model in the paper) in Table 7 (Inception ResNet v2), Table 8 (ArcFace), and Table 9 (DeepPrint). When we report results for each of these three DeepMDS++ models at higher dimensions in the paper, we simply discard later block units and retrain. In all of our comparisons with the original DeepMDS [17], we utilize the same repeating block unit architectures for the DeepMDS baseline. 
